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Abstract—Many specifications include assumptions on the
environment. If the environment satisfies the assumptions then
a correct system reacts as intended. However, when the environ-
ment deviates from its expected behavior, a correct system can
behave arbitrarily. We want to synthesize robust systems that
degrade gracefully, i.e., a small number of environment failures
should induce a small number of system failures. We define ratio
games and show that an optimal robust system corresponds to
the winning strategy of a ratio game, where the system minimizes
the ratio of system errors to environment errors. We show that
ratio games can be solved in pseudopolynomial time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that a system is required to accept up to 1000
requests per second and to respond to each request within 0.1
seconds. What should the system do when request number
1001 arrives? There are several options, including terminating
the system, dropping the extra request, or delaying a response.
Clearly, all of these approaches satisfy the specification, but
some are better than others. (Cf. [1].)
The formal functional specifications used in Design Au-
tomation typically only describe the behavior of a system in
absence of environment failures. That is, (parts of) the speci-
fication are of the form A → G, where A is an environment
assumption and G is a guarantee. This approach leaves the
behavior of the system unspecified when A is not fulfilled
and neither verification tools nor synthesis tools take such
behavior into account. In practice, however, the environment
may fail, due to incomplete specifications, operator errors,
faulty implementations, transmission errors, and the like. Thus,
a system should not only be correct, it should also be robust,
meaning that it “behaves ‘reasonably,’ even in circumstances
that were not anticipated in the requirements specification
[. . . ]” [2].
For instance, consider the following informal specification
of an arbiter. Initially, both input r (for request) and output g
(for grant) are low. If the environment raises r, the system will
eventually raise g. The environment is not allowed to lower
r before g is raised. After g is raised, r must be lowered
eventually, after which g is lowered. The obvious formalization
of this specification does not have any requirements on the
behavior of the system if the environment lowers a request
too early. In fact, if this ever occurs, the system can act
arbitrarily from that time on. This is clearly unreasonable,
because the system can fulfill all its requirements even in this
case. In general, of course, the system may have to fail in some
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way if the environment does. However, we prefer graceful
degradation: the system error should increase slowly with the
environment error.
This paper proposes a formal notion of robustness through
graceful degradation for discrete functional safety properties:
A small error by the environment should induce only a small
error by the system, where the error is defined quantitatively as
part of the specification, for instance, as the number of failures.
Given such a specification, we define a system to be robust if
a finite environment error induces only a finite system error.
As a more fine-grained measure of robustness, we define the
notion of k-robustness, meaning that on average, the number
of system failures is at most k times larger than the number
of environment failures. We show that the synthesis question
for robust systems can be solved in polynomial time as a one-
pair Streett game and that the synthesis question for k-robust
systems can be solved using ratio games. Ratio games are a
novel type of graph games in which edges are labeled with a
cost for each player, and the aim is to minimize the ratio of the
sum of these costs. We show that ratio games are positional,
that the associated decision problem is in NP ∩ co-NP, and
that they can be solved in pseudopolynomial time. They can
be solved in polynomial time if the cost of a failure is assumed
to be constant.
Section II fixes the notation used in the paper. In Section III,
we present our framework based on error functions, and define
robustness and k-robustness. In Section IV, we introduce ratio
games and show how to solve them. Section V shows how
to use ratio games to construct correct and robust systems.
We present related work in Section VI and conclude in
Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For a word w = w1 . . . , let |w| ∈ N∪{∞} be the length of
the word and let w[..i] = w1 . . . wi be the prefix of length i.
We denote the set of all finite (infinite) words over the alphabet
A by A∗ (Aω).
We consider systems with a set of input signals I and a
set of output signals O. We define AP = I ∪ O. We use
the signals as atomic propositions in the specifications defined
below. Our input alphabet is thus ΣI = 2I , the output alphabet
is ΣO = 2O, and we define Σ = 2AP .
Moore machines: We use Moore machines to represent
systems. A Moore machine with input alphabet ΣI and output
alphabet ΣO is a tuple M = (Q, q0, δ, λ), where Q is the
set of states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, δ : Q × ΣI → Q
is the transition function, and λ : Q → ΣO is the output
function. In each state, the Moore machine outputs a letter in
ΣO, then reads a letters in ΣI , and moves to the next state. The
run of M on a sequence x = x0x1 . . . ∈ ΣIω is a sequence
ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Qω, where ρ0 = q0 and ρi+1 = δ(ρi, xi). The
corresponding word is λ(ρ) = w0w1 . . . ∈ Σω, where wi =
λ(ρi) ∪ xi. The language of M , L(M) ⊆ Σω, consists of the
words corresponding to the runs of M . We define L∗(M) =
L(M) ∩ Σ∗.
Automata: A complete deterministic automaton over the
alphabet Σ is a tuple A = (Q, q0, δ), where Q is a finite set
of states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and δ : Q × Σ → Q is
the transition function. A run of an automaton A on a word
w = w0w1 . . . ∈ Σ∗ ∪ Σω is the longest sequence ρ(w) =
ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Q∗ ∪Qω such that ρ0 = q0, and ρi+1 = δ(ρi, wi).
The product automaton A = A1 × A2 of two automata is
defined as usual.
A safety automaton A = (Q, q0, δ, F ) is a complete de-
terministic automaton (Q, q0, δ) together with a set F ⊆ Q
of accepting states such that there are no edges from non-
accepting to accepting states.An infinite run is accepting if it
never leaves F . An automaton accepts a word if its run is
accepting. We call the set L(A) of infinite words accepted by
A the language of A.
Specifications: We use safety automata to specify the
desired behavior of a Moore machine. Given a safety au-
tomaton A, we say the Moore machine M satisfies A, if
L(M) ⊆ L(A). In our examples, we also show LTL formulas
describing the discussed properties. Readers familiar with LTL
[3] will find them useful, while they can be safely ignore by
readers not familiar with LTL.
Single and Double Cost Automata: A single (double) cost
automaton over the alphabet Σ is a tuple C = (Q, q0, δ, c)
consisting of a complete deterministic automaton (Q, q0, δ)
and a cost function c : Q × Σ → N (c : Q × Σ → N × N,
respectively) that associates to each transition a value in
N (N × N, resp.) called cost. In a double cost automaton,
we use cs and ce to refer to the cost function of the first
and the second component, respectively. The maximal cost
is the smallest W ∈ N ∀q ∈ Q, σ ∈ Σ : c(q, σ) ≤ W
(ce(q, σ), cs(q, σ) ≤ W ). The cost of a word w ∈ Σ∗ ∪ Aω,
denoted by C(w), is the sum
∑|W |
i=0 c(ρ(w)i, wi), For double
cost automata, we use Ce(w) and Cs(w) to refer to the first
and second component, respectively, of the cost of the word
w.
The sum of two cost automata A1 = (Q1, q01, δ1, c1) and
A2 = (Q2, q02, δ2, c2) is the cost automaton A = A1 +
A2 = (Q, q0, δ, c), where A is the product of the automata
A1 and A2 with costs c = c1 + c2, i.e., c((q1, q2), σ) =
c1(q1, σ)+c2(q2, σ). The product of two single cost automata
A1 = (Q1, q01, δ1, c1) and A2 = (Q2, q02, δ2, c2) is a double
cost automaton A = A1 × A2 = (Q, q0, δ, c), where A is the
product of the automata A1 and A2 with costs c = (c1, c2),
i.e., c((q1, q2), σ) = (c1(q1, σ), c2(q2, σ)).
Games: A game graph is a finite directed graph G =
(S, s0, E) consisting of a set of states S, an initial state s0 ∈ S,
and a set of edges E ⊆ S×S such that each state has at least
one outgoing edge. The states are partitioned into a set S1
of Player-1 states and a set S2 of Player-2 states. When the
initial state is not relevant, we omit it and write (S,E). A play
ρ = s0s1 . . . ∈ Sω is an infinite sequence of states such that
for all i ≥ 0 we have (si, si+1) ∈ E. We denote the set of all
plays by Ω. Given a game graph G = (S,E), a strategy for
Player 1 is a function pi1 : S∗S1 → S mapping a sequence of
states ending in a Player-1 state to a successor state such that
for all s0 . . . si ∈ S∗S1, we have that (si, pi1(s0 . . . si)) ∈ E.
A Player-2 strategy is defined similarly. We denote by Π1 and
Π2 the set of all possible Player-1 and Player-2 strategies,
respectively. A strategy is positional if it depends only on the
current state. We present a positional strategy pip as a function
from Sp to S. Let ρ(pi1, pi2, s) denote the unique play starting
at s when Player 1 plays the strategy pi1 and Player 2 plays
pi2.
The value of a play is given by a value function v :
Ω → R ∪ {−∞,∞}. The value of a state s under strategy
pi1 and pi2, denoted by v(pi1, pi2, s), is the value of the play
ρ(pi1, pi2, s)We consider complementary objectives for the two
players: Player 1 tries to minimize the value of a state and
Player 2 tries to maximize it. (Note that the converse is more
usual.) The Player-1 value of a state s under the strategy
pi1 is suppi2∈Π2(v(pi1, pi2, s)). A strategy pi1 is optimal for
Player 1 in state s if the Player-1 value of the state s under
the strategy pi1 is minimal. The Player-2 value and Player-2
optimal strategies are defined correspondingly. The value of
a state s denoted by v(s) is the Player-1 value of the play
starting in s, in which both players play optimally.
A game is a game graph together with a value function.
The game graph defines the possible actions of the players.
The value function describes the objectives of the players.
A mean payoff game is describe as a tuple ((S, s0, E), w),
where (S, s0, E) is a game graph and w : E → N is a
payoff function. The value function for a play ρ = s0s1 . . .
in a mean payoff game is v(ρ) = lim supn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=0 w(ei)
with ei = (si, si+1). A one-pair Streett game is a tuple
((S, s0, E), F1, F2) consisting of a game graph (S, s0, E) and
two sets F1, F2 ⊆ S, where v(ρ) = 0 iff (∀i ≥ 0 ∃j ≥ i :
sj ∈ F1) → (∀i ≥ 0 ∃j ≥ i : sj ∈ F2). We say a Streett
game is winning for Player 1 if the value of the initial state
s0 is 0.
An automaton A = (Q, q0, δ) over the alphabet Σ can be
translated into a game graph (S, s0, E) as follows. We define
the set of Player-1 states as S1 = {s(q,σi) | q ∈ Q and σi ∈
ΣI}∪ {s0}. The Player-2 states S2 are given by the set S2 =
{s(q,σo) | q ∈ Q and σo ∈ ΣO}. The set of game states is
the set S = S1 ∪ S2. Every state of the game (except for the
initial state) represents a state of the automaton and an input
or output label. Note that this corresponds to moving from
a transition-labeled to a state-labeled system. Every outgoing
transition of a state q in A is translated into two steps of the
game: first, Player 1 chooses a letter σo from ΣO by moving
to the states s(q,σo), then Player 2 chooses a letter σi from
ΣI and moves according to the transition relation to a new
state s(q′,σi) such that δ(q, σo ∪ σi) = q′. Formally, we have
that E1 = {(s(q,σi), s(q,σo)) | q ∈ Q, σo ∈ ΣO, and σI ∈
ΣI} ∪ {(s0, sqo,σo) | σo ∈ ΣO}, E2 = {(s(q,σo), s(q′,σI)) |
q, q′ ∈ Q, σo ∈ ΣO, σI ∈ ΣI , and δ(q, σo ∪ σi) = q′}, and
E = E1 ∪ E2.
III. DEFINING ROBUSTNESS
In this section we introduce our notion of robustness based
on error specifications. We show how error specifications relate
to classical specifications and the notion of realizability. We
conclude with an example.
Definition 1. An error function is a function d : Σ∗ ∪ Σω →
N∪{∞}. The function is monotonically increasing in the sense
that if w′ is a prefix of w then d(w′) ≤ d(w).
An error specification is a pair of error functions (de, ds).
The error functions define a distance between allowed and
observed behavior, for instance, by measuring the number of
failures in some appropriate sense. Thus, d(w) = 0 indicates
that w fulfills the specification, and a higher value indicates a
more serious violation of the specification. Error specifications
provide a measure of “badness” for both the environment
behavior (using de) and the system behavior (using ds) and
form the specifications we use in the sequel. We assume that
these specifications are provided by the user.
Definition 2. A Moore machine M realizes an error specifi-
cation (de, ds) if ∀w ∈ L(M) : de(w) = 0 implies ds(w) = 0.
Thus, an error specification induces a classical specification
A → G, where A = {w ∈ Σω | de(w) = 0} and G = {w ∈
Σω | ds(w) = 0} are sets of infinite words.
The following notion is an alternative to realizability, for-
bidding the system to make mistakes before the environment
does.
Definition 3. A Moore machine M strictly realizes an error
specification (de, ds) if ∀w ∈ L∗(M) : de(w[..|w| − 1]) = 0
implies ds(w) = 0. An error specification is strictly realizable
if there exists a Moore machine that strictly realizes it.
Example 4. An example of a specification that is realizable
but not strictly realizable is A1 ∧ A2 → G1 ∧ G2, where x
is an input, y is an output, A1 requires that x is always true
(Gx), A2 says that x is initially equal to y (x ↔ y), G1
states that y is always true (G y), and G2 states that x in the
first step and y in the second step are different (x 6↔ (X y)).
All Moore machines that realize the specification start with
setting y to false, which violates the guarantees but forces the
environment to do the same1.
Definition 5. A Moore machine M is robust with respect to
an error specification (de, ds) if ∀w ∈ L(M) : de(w) 6= ∞
implies ds(w) 6=∞.
This means that a robust system can recover from a finite
environment error. Note that a system can be robust with
respect to a specification that it does not realize if it contains a
word with a finite system error but no environment error. Error
1This specification is based on an example by Marco Roveri.
specifications can forbid words by assigning infinite system
costs. (In particular, this is possible when such specifications
are given by double cost automata, as below.)
In order to calculate the quality of a robust system we want
to calculate the largest system error for every environment
error.
Definition 6. A Moore machine M is k-robust with respect
to an error specification (de, ds) if ∃d ∈ N : ∀w ∈ L∗(M) :
ds(w) ≤ k · de(w) + d.
Obviously, every k-robust system is robust, regardless of k.
Also, every robust system is k-robust for some finite k,
see Theorem 15, i.e., for every finite Moore machine, the
growth of the system error is either linear with respect to the
environment error or unbounded. This motivates our choice of
the robustness measure as a linear function. The definition of
k-robustness allows us to rank Moore machines with respect
to error specifications: A smaller k is better, it means that
the system error increases slowly with the environment error.
The constant d allows the system finitely many system failures
independent of the environment error. In this paper, we focus
on the infinite behavior of a machine, and note that d can
be bounded by the product of the size of the Moore machine
and the maximal weight. We leave minimization of d to future
work.
Definition 7. A Moore machine (k-)robustly (and strictly)
realizes an error specification if it (strictly) realizes the spec-
ification and it is (k-)robust with respect to the specification.
In the remainder, we use double cost automata to define
error specifications. The environment (system) error function
associated with C maps each w ∈ Σ∗ ∪Σω to its cost Ce(w)
(Cs(w), respectively). Note that a double cost automaton
can be seen as the product of two single cost automata.
We can construct an error specification from a set of cost
automataCAi for the system and CGi for the environment. The
error specification (a double cost automaton) is the product of
the sum of all CAi and the sum of all CGi .
Example 8. Consider a system with two request signals r1
and r2 as inputs and two grant signals g1 and g2 as out-
puts. We want the system to respond to each request with a
grant in the next step. Formally, we require that the system
satisfies Gi = G(ri → X gi) for i ∈ {1, 2}. The system
should also guarantee that grants are mutually exclusive, i.e.,
G3 = G¬(g1 ∧ g2). To avoid a contradicting specification,
we assume that requests are also mutually exclusive, i.e.,
A = G¬(r1 ∧ r2). Figure 1 shows two safety automata, one
for A and one for G1 and G2. Note that we summarize labels
on edges with Boolean expressions over ri and gi, where a
horizontal alignment of two variables represents a conjunction
and two vertically aligned variables are disjoint. We use a bar
to denote negation and ⊤ to denote true. States depicted with
two cycles are accepting states. Note that the automaton for
G3 is exactly the same as for A, where r1 and r2 are renamed
to g1 and g2, respectively.
s0 s1
r¯1
r¯2
r1r2
⊤
p0 p1 p2
ri
r¯igi
g¯i
r¯i rigi ⊤
Fig. 1. Automata for A = G(¬(r1 ∧ r2)) and Gi = G(ri → X gi).
s0
r¯1(0)
r¯2(0)
r1r2(1)
(a) CA
p0 p1
ri(0)
r¯igi(0)
g¯i(1)
r¯i(0) rigi(0)
(b) CGi
p0 p1
ri(0)
r¯igi(0)
r¯ig¯i(1)
rigi(0)
rig¯i(1)r¯i(0)
(c) C′
Gi
Fig. 2. Cost automata counting violations of A and Gi, respectively.
Starting from the specification A → (G1 ∧ G2 ∧ G3), we
can define what it means for the system and the environment
to fail. In particular, the environment violates assumption A
if it raises r1 and r2 at the same time. This corresponds to
taking the edge from s0 to s1. In Figure 2(a), we show a cost
automaton that counts every violation of the environment. Note
that once the environment “pays” for taking the edge r1r2,
we go back to the initial state, resetting the specification.
Similarly, if the system violates Guarantee Gi by choosing to
go from p1 to p2, it also incurs cost 1 as shown in Figure 2(b).
Note that it is up to the user to define the cost of a violation
and the state in which to continue after the specification is
violated. A reset or a skip are two natural alternatives. A
reset corresponds to an edge to the initial state. For a skip, we
simply add a self-loop. In Figure 2(c) we show an alternative
cost automaton for Gi with i ∈ {1, 2}, which uses a mixture
of reset and skip. For the cost automaton CGi , the word
(r1, g¯1)(r1, g¯1)(r¯1, g¯1)
ω has cost 1 whereas it has cost 2 for
the cost automaton C′Gi . For the second automaton, the cost
corresponds to the number of unanswered requests.
The costs on the edges are given by the user. For instance,
the user might consider a violation of the mutual-exclusion
properties G3 more severe and associate with it a higher cost
than a violation of the response properties G1 or G2.
Given cost automata CG1 , CG2 , and CG3 that describe
the cost and the behavior associated with a violation of the
corresponding property (cf. Fig. 2), we can construct a cost
automaton CG = CG1 +CG1 + CG1 for G = G1 ∧G2 ∧G3.
The automaton CG defines the error function of the system.
The cost automaton for the environment CA (cf. Fig. 2(a))
specifies the error function of the environment. The product
C = CA × CG is the error specification.
Figure 3(a) shows a system M (synthesized with Lily [4])
for the specification A→ G. It is easy to see that M satisfies
A→ G. As long as the environment satisfies A, which means
that it does not provide r1 and r2 simultaneously, the system
responds to each ri with the corresponding gi in the next
step. However, M is not robust with respect to C: The input
sequence i = (r1r2)(r¯1r2)ω has cost one, but the output of
g1g¯2
g¯1g2
g1g¯2
r1r2
r1r2
r1r¯2r¯1
⊤
r¯1
r1r¯2
(a) Non-robust
g¯1g¯2
g¯1g2
g1g¯2
r1r2
r¯1
r1r2
r1r¯2
r1r¯2r¯1
r1r2
r¯1
r1r¯2
(b) 2-robust
g1g¯2
g¯1g2
r¯1r2
r1
r¯2
r1
r¯2
r¯1r2
(c) 1-robust
Fig. 3. A non-robust, 2-robust, and a 1-robust system.
the system has cost ∞.
Figure 3(b) and 3(c) show two systems that are robust
with respect to the error specification, for any word with
finitely many environment errors the systems produce finitely
many system errors. The system in Figure 3(b) is 2-robust
with respect to the error specification whereas the system in
Figure 3(c) is 1-robust. For the input (r1r2)ω the output of
the first Moore machine is (g¯1g2)(g¯1g¯2)ω and for the second
it is (g1g¯2)ω .
Note that out of the three systems in Figure 3 (which all
satisfy A → G) the system in Figure 3(c) is the most robust
one. In our opinion, it is also the one most likely to please the
designer.
In Section V we show how to synthesize (strictly) realizing
robust and k-robust systems from an error specification. We
also show how these notions can be verified. The next section
introduces Ratio games, which are crucial to our synthesis
algorithms.
IV. RATIO GAMES
In this section we introduce ratio games, which we need to
synthesize k-robust systems. Intuitively, a system is k-robust
if the ratio of the system error to the environment error is
smaller than or equal to k for every word of the system. An
optimal strategy for Player 1 in a ratio game minimizes this
ratio.
Definition 9. A ratio game2 G is a tuple ((S, s0, E), w1, w2)
consisting of a game graph (S, s0, E) and two weight func-
tions w1, w2 : E → N mapping edges to non-negative integer
values. The value function for a play ρ = s0s1 . . . ∈ Sω is
v(ρ) = lim
m→∞
lim sup
l→∞
∑l
i=m w1(si, si+1)
1 +
∑l
i=m w2(si, si+1)
(1)
Ratio games are a generalization of mean payoff games. If
w2(e) = 1 for all e ∈ E, then G is a mean payoff game. Note
that the sequence of quotients for l→∞ might diverge, which
requires the use of lim sup or lim inf . We follow the definition
of mean payoff games and take the lim sup. The outer-most
limit ensures that only the infinite behavior is relevant as in
the definition of k-robustness, i.e., if
∑∞
i=0 w1(ei) is finite,
then v(ρ) = 0. The addition of 1 in the denominator avoids
2Our graph-based ratio games should not be confused with those of [5],
which represent games in a normal form, enumerating all strategies. We cannot
use that representation to obtain a polynomial algorithm.
division by zero. It does not influence the value of v(ρ) if∑∞
i=0 w2(ei) is infinite.
The maximal weight W in a ratio game ((S, s0, E), w1, w2)
is defined by W = max{wi(e) | e ∈ E, i ∈ {1, 2}}. Note that
the value v(ρ) of a play ρ, where both players play positional
strategies, is in the set V = {0, 1|S|·W , . . . ,
|S|·W
1 ,∞}. Lemma
10 shows that ratio games have optimal positional strategies,
which implies that it suffices to consider positional strategies
and that the value of every state is in V .
Lemma 10. Ratio games have optimal positional strategies.
Proof: It suffices to show that the two one-player games
(S2 = ∅, respectively S1 = ∅) have optimal positional
strategies [6]. Consider a game graph G with S2 = ∅. Take
in G a simple cycle with the minimum ratio r of all simple
cycles.We show that the positional strategy pi1 that goes to
this simple cycle and stays within it forever is optimal. Note
that the value v(ρ) of the play ρ induced by the strategy pi1
is r, since the outer-most limit in Eq. 1 allows us to ignore
a finite prefix of ρ. If r = 0, the claim trivially holds. If
r = ∞, then in any simple cycle the sum of the weights
w2 is 0 and the sum of the weights w1 is strictly greater
than 0. This implies that all edges e on cycles have weight
w2(e) = 0 and in every cycle there is at least one edge e
with w1(e) > 0, and so any infinite play has ratio ∞. For
0 < r <∞, let r be a
b
for some integers a, b > 0 and let ρ′ be
an arbitrary play in the single player game. We decompose ρ′
into a sequence of ratios a1
b1
, a2
b2
. . . by the following procedure
(cf. [7]): we put the states of ρ′ on a stack in the order of their
appearance, once we encounter a state q that is already on the
stack, we remove the sequence from the first to the second
appearance of q and compute its ratio ai
bi
. Note that the sum
of the weights w1 and w2 in this cycle can be ci-times larger
than ai and bi, respectively, where ci is some integer constant
between 1 and W · |S|. Note that the height of the stack is at
most |S|. Due to the outer-most limit, we can ignore the part
of ρ′ that is always left on the stack in the computation of the
value v(ρ′). Then, v(ρ′) = lim supl→∞
∑
l
i=1
ci·ai
1+
∑
l
i=1
ci·bi
for some
constants 0 < ci ≤ W · |S|. Since the minimum simple-cycle
ratio is a
b
, we know that ai
bi
≥ a
b
for all i > 0 and together
with the fact that ci’s are positive integer constants, we know
that v(ρ′) ≥ lim supl→∞
∑
l
i=1
a
1+
∑
l
i=1
b
and therefore v(ρ′) ≥ a
b
.
The proof for Player-2 games is analogous.
The decision problem of a ratio (mean payoff) game is,
given a ratio r (mean payoff v) decide if the value of the game
is at least r (v). The decision problem for mean payoff games
is in NP ∩ co-NP [7]. We show how the decision problem for
ratio games can be reduced to the decision problem of mean
payoff games. The reduction shows that the decision problem
for ratio games is in NP ∩ co-NP. We also use this reduction to
calculate the values of the states in a ratio game. The reduction
is similar to that used by Lawler [8] for the reduction of ratio
graphs to the minimal mean cycle problem.
Lemma 11. Let GR = ((S, s0, E), w1, w2) be a ratio game
with maximal weight W . Given a ratio a
b
with 0 ≤ a ≤ |S|·W
and 0 < b ≤ |S| ·W , we can decide whether a state has value
v = a
b
, v < a
b
, or v > a
b
in O(|S|3 ·W 2 · |E|) time.
Proof: We reduce the decision for the ratio game to a
decision for the mean payoff game GMP = ((S, s0, E), w)
with payoff function w(e) = b · w1(e) − a · w2(e). In the
following, let vR (vR(ρ)) be the value (of run ρ) in GR and
similarly for vMP.
We show that vR ≤ ab implies vMP ≤ 0 and vR ≥
a
b
implies
vMP ≥ 0. The decision whether vMP < 0, vMP = 0, or vMP > 0
can be made in O(|S|2 · W ′ · |E|) time, where W ′ is the
maximal weight in the mean-payoff game [7]. We have W ′ ≤
b ·W ≤ |S| ·W 2, thus the decision for the ratio game can be
made in O(|S|3 ·W 2 · |E|) time.
Suppose vR ≤ ab . We show that Player 1 can achieve
a run of value at most 0 in GMP and thus vMP ≤
0. Let pi1 be a positional optimal Player-1 strategy for
GR and let pi2 be a positional optimal strategy for
Player 2 in GMP. Because both strategies are positional,
ρ(s0, pi1, pi2) consists of a stem and a simple cycle, say
ρ = (e′1, . . . , e
′
m) · (e1, . . . , en)
ω
. Note that vR(ρ) =∑
n
i=0
w1(ei)∑
n
i=0
w2(ei)
and vMP(ρ) =
b
∑
n
i=0
w1(ei)−a
∑
n
i=0
w2(ei)
n
. Sup-
pose
∑n
i=0 w1(ei) > 0, then, since vR ≤
a
b
and is thus finite,
we have
∑n
i=0 w2(ei) > 0. It follows that
∑
n
i=0
w1(ei)∑
n
i=0
w2(ei)
≤ a
b
implies b
∑
n
i=0
w1(ei)−a
∑
n
i=0
w2(ei)
n
≤ 0. If
∑n
i=0 w1(ei) = 0,
then
b
∑
n
i=0
w1(ei)−a
∑
n
i=0
w2(ei)
n
=
−(a
∑
n
i=0
w2(ei))
n
≤ 0.
The proof that vR ≥ ab implies that vMP ≥ 0 is similar,
using an optimal strategy for Player 2 in GR.
Theorem 12. Given a ratio game ((S,E), w1, w2) with max-
imal weight W , the value for every s ∈ S can be computed
in O(|S|3 ·W 2 · |E| · log(|S| ·W )).
Proof: We use the decision procedure from Lemma 11 to
perform a binary search on the list of possible values V \{∞}.
If the ratio is greater than |S| · W , it is infinite. There are
less than (|S| · W )2 different ratios, thus we need at most
2 · log(|S| ·W ) calls to the decision procedure.
Given an algorithm to find the values of the game we can
use the “group testing” technique from [7] to find optimal
positional strategies.
Theorem 13. Given a ratio game ((S,E), w1, w2) with max-
imal weight W , positional optimal strategies for both players
can be found in O(|S|4 · log( |E||S| ) · |E| · log(|S| ·W ) ·W 2).
All our ratio game algorithms are polynomial in the size of
the game graph but pseudopolynomial in the weights. They
are polynomial if W = 1.
V. VERIFYING AND SYNTHESIZING ROBUST SYSTEMS
This section describes the verification and synthesis algo-
rithms for robust systems. First, we establish the correlation
between the ratio in Definition 9 and k-robustness.
Any error specification C with cost functions ce and
cs can be translated into a ratio game G. The weight
functions w1 and w2 are given by the cost functions cs
and ce respectively. Formally, w1(2)((s(q,σi), s(q,σo))) = 0
and w1(2)((s(q,σo), s(q′,σi))) = cs(e)(q, σo ∪ σi), where
(s(q,σi), s(q,σo)) ∈ E1 and (s(q,σo), s(q′,σi)) ∈ E2 (see
Section II). Every play ρG = s0, s(q0,σo), s(q′,σi), s(q′,σ′o) . . .
of G corresponds to a run ρC = q0q′ . . . of C on w =
(σo, σi)(σ
′
o, σ
′
i).
Lemma 14. Given a Moore machine M and an error specifi-
cation C with cost function ce and cs, M is k-robust iff for all
words w ∈ L(M), the run ρ(w) = q0 . . . of C on w = w0 . . .
satisfies
v(w) = lim
m→∞
lim sup
l→∞
∑l
i=m cs(qi, wi)
1 +
∑l
i=m ce(qi, wi)
≤ k. (2)
Proof: If there exists a d ∈ N such that for
all finite prefixes w′ = w0 . . . wn of w we have∑n
i=0 cs(qi, wi) ≤ k ·
∑n
i=0 ce(qi, wi) + d, then∑
n
i=0
cs(qi,wi)
1+
∑
n
i=0
ce(qi,wi)
≤ k + d−k
1+
∑
n
i=0
ce(qi,wi)
holds as well. This
implies that limm→∞ lim supl→∞
∑
l
i=m
cs(qi,wi)
1+
∑
l
i=m
ce(qi,wi)
≤ k
because lim supl→∞
∑l
i=0 ce(qi, wi) is either some finite
value d′ or infinite. In the first case,
∑n
i=0 cs(qi, wi) ≤ k·d
′+d
for any n ≥ 0. Therefore, lim supl→∞
∑l
i=0 cs(qi, wi) is also
finite. Then, limm→∞ lim supl→∞
∑
l
i=m
cs(qi,wi)
1+
∑
n
i=m
ce(qi,wi)
= 0 ≤ k.
In the second case, limm→∞ lim supl→∞ d−k1+∑l
i=m
ce(qi,wi)
converges to 0.
For the other direction, consider the product CM of
C and M . Then, for all w ∈ L∗(M), Ce(w) =
CMe(w) =
∑|w|−1
i=0 ce(qi, wi) and Cs(w) = CMs(w) =∑|w|−1
i=0 cs(qi, wi), where ρCM (w) = q0 . . . q|w| is the run of
CM on w. Consider an arbitrary finite word w ∈ L∗(M), if
|w| ≤ |C| · |M |, then CMs(w) ≤ |C| · |M | ·W and Cs(w) ≤
k · Ce(w) + d holds for any k ≥ 0 and d = |C| · |M | ·W .
Otherwise, if |w| ≥ |C| · |M |, we can decompose the run
ρCM (w) into simple cycles c1, . . . , cm and a simple path p
consisting of the remaining nodes. (See proof of Lemma 10.)
Now consider the infinite words u1, . . . , um that correspond
to the runs leading to the cycles c1, . . . , cm, respectively, and
looping there forever. We know that u1, . . . , um are in L(M)
and, due to Eq. 2, that v(uj) ≤ k for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Therefore, for every cycle, the sums of the weights ce and
cs in the cycle, are either both 0 or their ratio is smaller or
equal to k. Let k = a
b
and let a1
b1
, . . . , am
bm
be the ratios of
the cycles whose ratio is nonzero, then
∑|w−1|
i=0 cs(qi, wi) =
d′ +
∑m
j=1 dj · aj and
∑|w−1|
i=0 ce(qi, wi) = d
′′ +
∑m
j=1 dj · bj
for some 0 ≤ d′, d′′ ≤ |C|·|M |·W and 1 ≤ dj ≤ |C|·|M |·W .
Using the fact that, if for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, aj
bj
≤ a
b
holds then
∑m
j=1 dj · aj ≤
a
b
∑m
j=1 dj · bj holds, we obtain∑|w−1|
i=0 cs(qi, wi) ≤
a
b
∑|w−1|
i=0 ce(qi, wi) + d
′
, which proves
that M is k-robust.
A. Verification
We show that any robust system is k-robust.
Theorem 15. If a Moore machine M with nM states is robust
with respect to an error specification C with nC states and
maximal system cost W , then M is (nC · nM ·W )-robust.
Proof: Let CM be the product of C and M . Lemma 14
shows that M is k robust if the ratio of all runs in CM
is smaller or equal to k. Since one-player ratio games are
positional (Lemma 10), the largest ratio corresponds to the
largest ratio of a simple cycle in CM , which cannot be larger
than nC · nM ·W because M is robust.
Next, we show how to verify if a given Moore machine is
robust or k-robust.
Theorem 16. Given a Moore machine M with nM states,
and an error specification C over the alphabet Σ, with nC
states and maximal cost W , we can decide if M is robust in
O(nC ·nM ·Σ) time. Given a k, we can check if M is k-robust
in O(n3C · n3M ·Σ) time.
Proof: Let CM be the product of C and M . M is not
robust iff CM contains a cycle that contains an edge with
nonzero system cost and no edge with nonzero environment
cost. This can be checked in time linear in the number of edges
in CM , which is nC · nM ·Σ. We have that M is k-robust if
the maximum simple cycle ratio in CM is smaller or equal to
k. The maximum simple cycle ratio in a graph with n states
and m transitions can be found in O(n2 · m) time [9], thus
we can find the maximum ratio in O(n3C · n3M ·Σ) time.
B. Synthesis
Next we show how to use Streett games to synthesize
(strictly) realizing and robust systems and how to use ratio
games to synthesize (strictly) realizing k-robust systems with
optimal k.
Lemma 17. Given an error specification C with n states and
alphabet Σ, we can decide if a robust system exists in O(n2 ·Σ)
time. If a robust system exists, it can be synthesized in O(n2·Σ)
time.
Proof: We translate the specification into a one-pair
Streett game, F1 is the set of states with incoming transitions
with system costs and F2 is the set of states with incoming
transitions with environment costs. One-pair Streett games can
be solved in O(n ·m), where n is the number of states and
m is the number of transitions [10].
Theorem 18. Given an error specification C with n states and
alphabet Σ, we can decide if a robust and (strictly) realizing
system exists in O(n2 ·Σ) time. The system can be synthesized
in O(n2 ·Σ) time.
Proof: In order to decide if a robust and realizing
system exists, build the product automaton CA1 = (Q ×
{q1, q2, q3}, q0, δ, c) of the error specification C and the au-
tomaton A1 shown in Figure 4(a). Let CA′1 be CA1, where
the system costs of all transitions corresponding to the loop
q1 q2
q3
cs = 0
ce = 0
cs 6= 0
ce = 0
ce 6= 0
ce = 0
ce 6= 0
true
(a) Automaton A1.
q1
q3
q2
cs = 0
ce = 0
ce 6= 0
true
cs 6= 0
ce = 0
true
(b) Automaton A2.
Fig. 4. Automata for calculating realizability and strict realizability
on state q2 in Figure 4(a) are set to 1. Formally, the cost
function of CA′1 is c′((q, x), σ) = (1, ce((q, x), σ)) if x = q2
and δ((q, x), σ) = q2, and c′((q, x), σ) = c((q, x), σ) in all
other cases. Next, translate CA′1 into a Streett game as above
(proof of Lemma 17). A robust and realizing system exists iff
the game is winning, and the winning strategy corresponds to
a robust and realizing system.
First, assume there exists a winning strategy. No play
in which Player 1 plays optimally visits a q2-state in-
finitely often, because such a play has an infinite sys-
tem error and zero environment error. Consequently, all
words w = (σo, σi)(σ′o, σ′i) . . . associated with a play ρ =
s0, s(q0,σo), s(q′,σi), s(q′,σ′o) . . . where Player 1 plays optimally
satisfy Ce(w) = 0 implies Cs(w) = 0. Thus, the Moore
machine corresponding to the winning strategy realizes the
error specification. Second, assume there exists no winning
strategy. A play where Player 2 plays optimally, has a finite
environment cost and an infinite system cost. Either there
exists no robust system or the play visits a q2-state infinitely
often. In the second case no system realizes the specification.
Similarly, to check for a robust and strictly realizing sys-
tem, we build a Streett game from the product automaton
CA′2 of C and the automaton A2 of Figure 4(b), where the
system costs of all transitions corresponding to the loop on
state q2 are replaced by 1 and their environment costs are
set to 0. Then, again any Player-1 optimal play avoids q2-
states. Consequently, for all words associated with a play
where Player 1 plays optimally, all finite prefixes w′ satisfy
Ce(w
′[..|w′| − 1]) = 0 implies Cs(w′) = 0. Thus, the Moore
machine corresponding to a winning strategy strictly realizes
the error specification.
Lemma 19. Given an error specification C with n states,
input alphabet ΣI , output alphabet ΣO, and maximal cost W ,
if a robust system exists, a k-robust system with minimal k can
be synthesized in O(n5 · (|ΣI | + |ΣO|)4 · log( (|ΣO|+n·|ΣI |)|ΣI |+|ΣO| ) ·
(|ΣO|+ n · |ΣI |) · log(n · (|ΣI |+ |ΣO|) ·W ) ·W 2).
Proof: We synthesize k-robust systems with ratio games.
The game graph is constructed from the double cost automaton
C (see Section II). Lemma 14 shows that a positional strategy
with value k corresponds to a k-robust Moore machine. An
optimal positional strategy corresponds to a k-robust system
with smallest possible k and d ≤ |C| ·W .
The number of states in the game graph is n · |ΣI |+n · |ΣO|,
the number of edges is |E1| + |E2|, where |E1| = n · |ΣO|
and |E2| = n · n · |ΣI |. A winning strategy for Player 1 can
be found in O(n4 · (|ΣI | + |ΣO|)4 · log(n·(|ΣO|+n·|ΣI |)n·(|ΣI |+|ΣO|) ) · n ·
(|ΣO|+ n · |ΣI |) · log(n · (|ΣI |+ |ΣO|) ·W ) ·W 2).
Theorem 20. Given an error specification C with n states,
input alphabet ΣI , output alphabet ΣO , and maximal cost W ,
if a robust and (strictly) realizing system exists, a k-robust
system with minimal k that (strictly) realizes the specification
can be synthesized in O(n5 ·(|ΣI |+|ΣO|)4 ·log( (|ΣO|+n·|ΣI |)|ΣI |+|ΣO| )·
(|ΣO|+ n · |ΣI |) · log(n · (|ΣI |+ |ΣO|) ·W ) ·W 2).
Proof: For realizability translate CA′1 from the proof of
Theorem 18 into a ratio game. The system cost 1 for q2-states
guarantees that for any word w with Cs(w) 6= 0 and Ce(w) =
0 the ratio of the corresponding run has value ∞ in the ratio
game. The ratios of other plays are not changed. If a play visits
a q2-state finitely often, the ratio is not influenced because we
only look at the ratio in the limit.
For strict realizability translate CA′2 from the proof of
Theorem 18 into a ratio game. Since q2-states have system
cost 1 and environment cost 0, any run with a system failure
before an environment failure has value ∞ in the ratio game.
A Moore machine corresponding to an optimal strategy of
Player 1 is robust and (strictly) realizes the error specification.
If k is the value of the initial state then M is k-robust.
C. Synthesizing from Reset Error Specifications
As shown in Example 8 reset error specifications are an
intuitive kind of error specification. We show here that every
realizable reset error specification can be realized by a 1-robust
Moore machine.
Definition 21. A reset error specification is a double cost
automaton with maximal cost 1, such that for all transitions
(q, σ) with ce(q, σ) = 1 or cs(q, σ) = 1 the next state is
δ(q, σ) = q0.
Theorem 22. Given a realizable reset error specification C,
a 1-robust system can be synthesized in linear time.
Proof: Translate C into a ratio game with a linear blowup,
as in Lemma 19. We show that for an optimal strategy the
ratio is not greater than 1. Let pi1 be a strategy such that for
all resulting plays ρ = q0q1 . . .,
∑∞
i=0 ce(qi, qi+1) = 0 implies∑∞
i=0 cs(qi, qi+1) = 0. Thus, the system will not incur a cost
from any state reachable using pi1 without environment cost.
The only time a system cost may be incurred is when the
environment incurs a cost of 1, in which case the system may
also incur cost 1 and the system returns to the initial state.
VI. RELATED WORK
We have defined a system to be robust if a small environ-
ment error leads to a small system error. Other approaches
are possible. In the continuous domain, it is natural to require
systems to be continuous, which guarantees robustness in the
sense that a small output error can be guaranteed by an appro-
priately small input error [11]. This notion is not appropriate
in the discrete setting, as discrete functions are in general not
continuous. Consider, for example, a specification that requires
that the value of the output g is always true (false) if the initial
input r is true (false, respectively): (r → G g)∧(¬r → G¬g).
Here, a minimal difference in the input, namely a change of
the initial input, causes a maximal difference in the output.
The importance of robustness is widely recognized. Rinard,
for instance, advocates acceptability-oriented computing, stat-
ing that “complex computer systems should have a natural
resilience to errors” [12].
Attie et. al [13] argue that fault-intolerant programs are
often unrealistic. They introduce a framework to specify
fault-tolerant concurrent programs with CTL formulas and
differnent levels of tolerance, and show how to synthesize
such programs. Contrary to our work, this work considers
closed systems and requires the developer to specify possible
faults explicitly. Cury and Krogh consider synthesis of robust
controllers for discrete event systems, where a controller is
optimal if it produces the correct behavior for a maximal set of
plants including the original. This approach can beneficially be
combined with ours to yield systems that fulfill the guarantees
in a maximal set of cases and gracefully degrade otherwise.
Faella [14] considers the question of the appropriate be-
havior when a game is lost. He considers two notions, one
based on dominating strategies and one based on a probability
distribution over the input. In the former setting, he maximizes
the set of inputs for which the game is won, and in the latter
setting, the probability that the game is won. A similar problem
is considered in [15], where an unrealizable specification G,
which corresponds to a lost synthesis game, is generalized to
a specification A → G for a maximally weak environment
assumption A. None of these papers considers appropriate
behavior in the cases where a system failure is inevitable,
which is central to our notion of graceful degradation.
D’Souza and Gopinathan [16] consider a specification that
is built from a ranked set of requirements, which may be con-
tradictory. The requirements are “conflict tolerant”, i.e., when
overruled, they continue giving “advice.” This is achieved
through means closely related to our weighted edges. D’Souza
and Gopinath describe how to synthesize controllers in which
advice from a requirement is alternately followed and ignored.
The question they answer is how to synthesize a system that
always follows the highest ranked advice. The approach differs
from ours in the focus on contradictory specifications rather
than environment failures, and in the fact that the proper action
is chosen greedily, whereas we solve a global optimization
problem to find the appropriate behavior.
Alur, Kanade, and Weiss [17], consider prioritized require-
ments and present an efficient way to synthesize the highest
priority requirement. This is related in the sense that the ideal
specification may be left unfulfilled if necessary. What is
missing, from our perspective, is a way to “return” to a higher-
priority requirement.
Eisner considers properties in CTL of the form ψ = AGφ
(φ always holds) and calls a system robust if ψ holds in
all states, not just in the reachable states. This implies that
the system behaves well in the presence of environment
failures (assuming that any invariants used as antecedents are
weak), but Eisner states that control-intensive applications are
typically not robust [18].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a notion of robustness for functional
specifications based on graceful degradation. We have shown
how to solve the verification problem and the synthesis
problem for robust systems. The synthesis problem is solved
through a novel type of games.
We consider the worst case only: when a specification
only allows for k-robust systems, we do not distinguish
between systems in which every trace is strictly k-robust
and those in which some traces have fewer system faults.
However, Chatterjee [personal communication] has shown that
admissible (undominated) strategies do not always exist for
mean-payoff games, and this result easily generalizes to ratio
games, foiling the hope for a fully general solution. Another
venue for improvement would be to minimize the constant
d in the inequality between system and environment errors.
Furthermore, it is an open question how to extend our approach
to liveness.
It would be interesting to evaluate to which extent our notion
of robustness matches the intuitive notions designers use.
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